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ABSTRACT 
 
In a marine region once relatively remote, the melting Arctic ice cap creates 
opportunities for many in the international marine community. Shipping companies now 
have much shorter, more commercially viable sea routes between Europe and Asia for 
one to two summer months a year. Resources, such as oil, may now be easier to extract, 
and it is reported that the reserves under the Arctic polar cap are vast.  Further, tourism 
to the region has increased.  With the escalation of maritime traffic associated with these 
activities, there is also an increased risk of marine or maritime mishaps and disasters; 
hence, the need for an effective maritime plan for prevention and post mishap response.   
The impact of pollution and environmental catastrophes are heightened because 
of the fragile Arctic marine environment. In events such as an oil spill, the cleanup 
efforts may be more complex due to harsh, unpredictable weather conditions, varying 
stakeholders, differing political systems from the border countries and the accountability 
of who bears the cost. Further, the difficulty and complexity in accessing the region may 
result in increased pollution and loss of life in a maritime mishap/disaster. This 
complexity of interdependencies of stakeholders, environmental conditions, 
social/cultural/political concerns, and economics risk is known as a “wicked problem” 
which means planning for Arctic disaster is difficult or impossible to solve because of 
incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to 
recognize.   This type of disaster can have dramatic negative consequences on marine 
ecosystems, indigenous people and their cultures, and involved organizations and 
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governments operating in the Arctic. While law and policy have been put into place to 
promote unity and risk awareness, enforcing regulations governing the Arctic states has 
been an issue. How can collaboration to protect against and respond to marine and 
maritime mishaps/disasters be encouraged to become the norm among the various Arctic 
stakeholders in a complex “wicked problem” scenario? 
A model of cooperation among involved Arctic stakeholders is proposed as the 
most effective mechanism for an appropriate plan for prevention and response. 
Cooperation will not only increase effectiveness, but increases the speed of response. 
Two theory streams of cooperation are integrated into the model: Axelrod’s Art of 
Cooperation theory; and the Theory of Strategic Alliances.  The proposed model 
addresses the conditions and incentives for cooperation and the handling of “free rider” 
potential.  The model includes all stakeholders including but not limited to the eight 
Arctic states, nongovernmental organizations such as indigenous culture councils and 
environmental groups, and commercial enterprises.   Stakeholders face a “prisoner’s 
dilemma” from the wicked problem scenario in the Arctic which contributes to the need 
for incentives for cooperation among stakeholders to prevent mishaps and disasters in 
the region.  Further, potential solutions for collaboration to avoid negative outcomes in 
the Arctic are proposed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arctic ice is receding at a faster rate than expected. According to the 
National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) researchers, the length of the melting season has been growing 
(See Figure 1) and continues to grow by several days each decade since roughly 50 to 
100 years (Bond et al 2015). Navy scientists expect ice-free conditions for a full month 
each year by the mid-2030s, and two to three months ice-free by the year 2050 (US 
Navy 2014).  As the Arctic ice melts, more opportunities are presented to visit the 
region, extract resources, and impact the local populations.  Further, as these events 
increase, competition among stakeholders is triggered creating disputes among 
traditional Arctic states and non-Arctic stakeholders (Hong 2012).  
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Arctic Environment 
 
 
Figure 1. Artic Sea Ice Boundary Changes 
 
Source: Dunbar, 2005 
 
For the maritime industry, shorter shipping routes from Europe to Asia mean 
reduced inventory costs for shippers and fuel savings for shipping companies (Keil 
2014).   If canal fees and other variables are included to determine freight rates, these 
shortcuts could cut the costs of large container ships traversing the Arctic by billions of 
dollars a year (Hong, 2012). Some shippers have already begun transit through the 
Bering Strait using two main Arctic routes: the northern sea route along the Russian 
coast and the Northwest Passage through Canada (Lasserre 2012). 
For the maritime tourism industry, several Arctic regions as well as Greenland 
and Svalbard continue to grow as destinations (Snyder 2007).  As populations age in 
western economies (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015), consumers seek 
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experiences rather than goods (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002).  Travelling to unusual 
destinations is an attractive way to create these experiences (IMO 2014).  As the Arctic 
becomes more easily accessible, tourism traffic is predicted to exponentially increase 
(Snyder 2007) 
The fishing industry has a major economic stake in the Arctic and continues to 
grow as Norway, Russia, and Greenland try to maximize the value of fish stocks 
(Lasserre 2012).   Overfishing has presented many problems for nations, leading to 
piracy and civil unrest in other parts of the world, which could in the future take place in 
the Arctic (Carchidi and Mileski 2013).  In an effort to seek new fishing areas and access 
fish species that are limited currently in traditional fishing regions of the Arctic, fishing 
traffic will increase as the Arctic becomes more accessible (Knapp 2014).   
The most significant industry with the largest potential impact on the Arctic 
region is the oil and gas industry (See Figure 2).  The US geological survey in 2008 
estimated that nearly one-quarter of the world’s oil and gas reserves lie beneath the 
Arctic waters (Harsem et al 2011).   In addition to hydrocarbon exploitation, land-based 
mining in the Arctic has also contributed to the increased traffic by bringing supplies and 
machinery to the mines, and transporting valuable minerals back to their markets 
(Reuters 2011).   
As the maritime traffic associated with these activities continues to increase in 
the Arctic, so does the risk of disaster in the fragile Arctic marine environment 
(Cunningham 2012) including ship strikes of whales, noise perturbation, chronic 
pollution, and an unknown magnitude of consequences if other disasters take place 
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(Huntington et al 2015). The fishing safety of the indigenous people, the protection of 
the indigenous peoples’ heritage and culture, the displacement of animals, and the 
impact to food security from contaminants are all at risks (Huntington et al 2015).  
ARCTIC OPPORTUNITIES 
Figure 2. Arctic Opportunity and Activity 
Source: Bender, 2014 
Effective planning and improved techniques are needed in order to effectively 
prevent and respond to disaster.  For example, potential oil spills from oil extraction in 
ice covered waters require enhanced techniques in terms of accessibility, pollution 
prevention, and response, especially in areas such as the Alaskan outer continental shelf. 
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Current methods of oil spill response in ice-covered waters would face increased 
logistical and technical barriers to ensure maritime safety and environmental protection, 
all while respecting local culture (Wilkinson et al 2015).   Overcoming barriers such as 
these, require collaborative action. Developing rules to best manage these risks in the 
Arctic will require action and cooperation locally, nationally, and internationally 
(Cunningham 2012).    
Managing for all the potential consequences of and impacts from increased 
maritime traffic stemming, from fishing, oil and gas exploration, maritime mining and 
extraction, and other kinds of high-environmental-impact activities is a “wicked 
problem.” A wicked problem is one where the planning for adverse events is difficult or 
impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements 
that are often difficult to recognize. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the wicked 
maritime problem of the Arctic, to highlight the unique difficulties and consequences for 
states in pursuit of the Arctic’s growing opportunities and untapped resources, and to 
propose a solution through a model of corporation among Arctic stakeholders in order to 
effectively plan for prevention and post mishap response. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Arctic and Its Unique Maritime Environment 
 
The Arctic environment is vast and considered the most unique ecosystem on the 
planet (The Arctic Environment 2014). The “Arctic” refers to the northernmost region of 
the Earth and is north of the Arctic Circle.  As of March 24, 2015, it runs approximately 
66 degrees, 34 minutes north of the Equator (Webster 2000).   The Arctic region 
includes of parts of Alaska (United States), Canada, Finland, Greenland (Denmark), 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden (Nsidc.org 2015). What makes the region unique 
includes, among other traits, is its treeless tundra or permafrost, its midnight sun in the 
summer (sun does not set on the summer solstice), and its polar night (sun does not rise 
on the winter solstice) in the winter.  The north of “tree line” defines this region with an 
average daily summer temperature not exceeding 10 degrees Celsius (Nsidc.org 2015). 
Another unique characteristic is cultural: the Arctic is home to indigenous people who 
have adapted to its cold and extreme conditions such as the indigenous Inuit population 
(Freeman 2001). 
Information on the marine environmental systems of the Arctic is limited, and the 
impact of human activity is currently unknown compared to non-Arctic environmental 
systems (Bard 1999).  This lack of information and underestimation of human activity 
may lead to the rapid degradation and changing circumstances of the Arctic environment 
(Abramov et al 2014).  For example, there is a relative lack of good ship charts, 
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communication systems, and other navigational aids for mariners (IMO 2014). Further, 
disaster from maritime activities can result in ripple effects, impacting the indigenous 
populations, the environment and other stakeholders as well as raising other social, 
political, economic, and legal concerns. For example, disaster may pollute food sources 
of indigenous people, which may cause legal action to perpetrators. 
The combination of the unique environment and the remoteness of Arctic 
increases the difficulty in handling maritime logistics including shipping, tourism, 
fishing or resource extraction (Ehlers et. al 2014; IMO 2014). For maritime operations, 
the remoteness combined with fog, darkness, and ice brings about challenges with 
visibility and infrastructure, or the lack thereof (Ehlers et. al 2014). Further, emergency 
response is critically limited by the paucity of infrastructure, the distance to travel, the 
weather, and the harsh operating conditions (Hong 2012). The Arctic environment’s 
drifting sea ice caused by multi-year ice (IMO 2014) and icing of equipment brings other 
challenges, which may shut down communication and evacuation systems to vessels 
(Ehlers et. al 2014). In addition to the harsh weather and remoteness of the Arctic, 
additional challenges occur due to maritime activities.  For example, noise from the 
seismic surveys ships conducted during oil exploration can injure non-human animals 
(such as whales) that are in close proximity and, in turn, may lead to fatalities 
(Cunningham 2012). Further, these animals such as marine mammals use sound not only 
to sense their environment but also to communicate with one another (Huntington et. al 
2015).   In addition to noise pollution, maritime activities can contribute to other types of 
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pollution. Air quality in the Arctic can also be impacted: emissions are predicted to grow 
by 150 to 600 percent by 2025 (Azzara and Rutherford 2015).  
A social concern created by increased maritime activities within the Arctic region 
is overcoming challenges involving the indigenous people.  The culture of the 
indigenous people may be jeopardized in many ways.  The nomadic culture of some 
indigenous people active off shore would be significantly changed by large vessels 
maneuvering in their natural habitat (Huntington et al 2015).  Food supplies could be 
disrupted due to changes made by increased activity.  The large commercial ships 
competing for the same water routes with small boats used by the indigenous people 
may impact the peoples’ ability to hunt and fish safely.  This would impact their 
economic viability as a culture as well because of the potential significant loss in food 
supplies or trade.  Further, the increased presence on non-indigenous people due to the 
increase in maritime activities may profoundly impact the indigenous culture by 
uprooting groups and tainting traditional practices all for economic gain (Grant 2009).   
From a legal and political perspective, the disappearance of the Arctic sea ice 
raises sovereignty issues among the circumpolar states.  However,  the Arctic Council 
includes non circumpolar states such as Denmark (Hong 2012). Unlike the Antarctic, 
which has a treaty system to regulate international relations with respect to the Antarctic 
region treaty, the Arctic is not covered by a treaty that governs the region as a whole 
(Jensen 2007). The United Nations Arctic Council is an inter-governmental forum 
established by means of a non-legally binding declaration formed to foster cooperation 
and dialogue among the indigenous people and Arctic Nations (Koivurova and Molenaar 
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2009).  The Arctic Council is the primary international governing body consisting of the 
eight Arctic States: Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden, and the United States (Koivurova and Molenaar 2009).  The Arctic Council 
currently has two treaties on Cooperation as it relates to disaster.   The first legally 
binding treaty signed by Arctic Council members in 2011 is: “The Agreement on 
Cooperation Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (AMSRA)” 
(Huebert et. al 2012). The second legally binding agreement signed by the Arctic 
Council in 2013 is: “The Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2013).  These treaties promote unity and 
increases awareness; however, the problem of enforcing laws governing the Arctic states 
remains a difficult task.   
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), also a UN body, has produced 
guidelines for maritime traffic in Arctic waters.  The International Code for Ships 
Operating in Polar Waters (known as the Polar Code) was adopted in November, 2014 as 
an amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) to 
protect seafarer and passengers in the harsh environment of the waters surrounding the 
two poles.   The provisions of the Polar Code include both safety and environmental 
related provisions.  These provisions will become mandatory under SOLAS and the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).  The 
expected date of entry into force of the SOLAS amendments is January 1, 2017; 
however, ships constructed before this date will need to meet certain requirements. The 
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IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MERC) has approved the draft of 
the amendments to make the Polar Code provisions mandatory under MARPOL.   
The Polar Code provisions cover the full range of shipping-related matters 
relevant to navigation in waters around the two poles such as ship design, construction 
and equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and the protection 
of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar region from increased maritime 
activity.  Ships intending to operate in the defined waters of Antarctic and Arctic must 
have a Polar Ship Certificate.  Further, ships would need to carry a Polar Water 
Operational Manual, which provides the owner, operator, master, and crew with detailed 
information regarding the ship’s operational capabilities and limitations.  Among many 
goals and requirements, there are provisions to prevent pollution from oil, noxious liquid 
substances, sewage, and garbage (IMO 2014).  Yet, enforcement of these provisions 
continues to be a critical issue. 
In addition to the Arctic Council and the IMO, the United Nations also provides a 
legal framework under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty.  
However, not all Arctic Council members have ratified UNCLOS (UN, 2015).  The 
United States is the only country with claims to the Arctic who has not ratified 
UNCLOS. One of the major features of the UNCLOS is its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). The EEZ establishes a coastal zone extending 200 nautical miles from the coastal 
baseline over which the coastal state retains exclusive economic rights, including the 
right to explore, exploit, and manage all living and non-living resources. Territorial 
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waters extend 12 NM from the baseline (e.g., low-water mark) of a coastal state and is 
the state’s sovereign territory except for innocent passage of foreign vessels (See Figure 
3); the contiguous zone extends from the territorial sea up to 24 NM and a coastal state 
can exert limited control over such areas as customs and immigration: the EEZ extends 
form the territorial sea, includes the contiguous zone, and out to 200 miles (unless there 
is an overlap) and may include the continental shelf, depending on the latter’s location 
(See Figure 4).  
Various countries have policies related to the Arctic (See Table 1). For example, 
the U.S. 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region guides, prioritizes, and 
synchronizes the three priorities for the Arctic national and homeland security interests; 
responsible stewardship and international cooperation. 
Figure 3. Arctic Boundaries                          
Source: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015 
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Table 1. Arctic Law & Policy 
Countries Laws Policy 
Canada 
• Canada’s Arctic policy includes plans
and provisions for regional governments.
Norway • Norway’s policy on Arctic governance
gives priority to the following FIVE
areas:
• International cooperation,
• Development knowledge-based business
sector
• Knowledge development
• Infrastructure
• Emergency preparedness and 
environmental protection
United 
States 
(Alaska) 
• National Security Presidential
Directive 66
• Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 25
• Freedom of Navigation
• Protecting the Ocean Environment
• Maritime Security Policy
• National Strategy for Maritime Security
Russia • Russian Federation in the Arctic for the
period 2020 and beyond
• Maritime Doctrine of the Russian
Federation for the period up to 2020
Greenland 
(Denmark) 
• Denmark’s policy is to work for a
peaceful, secure, and safe Arctic with
self-sustaining growth and development
with respect for the Arctic’s fragile
climate, environment, and nature in
close cooperation with international
partners
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Table 1. Continued 
Finland • Finland’s Arctic policy is to enhance its
involvement in the region.
Countries Laws Policy 
Iceland • Iceland’s policy 12 principles
promoting:
• Arctic Council securing position
• Understanding of the region,
resolving differences under the
United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea
• Increasing cooperation,
• Supporting indigenous people rights
• Cooperation
• Prevent human induced climate
change
• Safeguard security
• Develop trade relations
• Advancing knowledge
Increasing domestic cooperation within 
Iceland  
Sweden • Policy seen through three priorities:
• The climate and the environment
• Economic development
• Human dimension
14 
Figure 4. Arctic Circle Territories and Claims 
Source: The Economist, (2009) 
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The US Arctic policy is based on two documents:  the National Security 
Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, both initiated 
in 2009.  Arctic directives include Freedom of Navigation (PDD/NSC-32); protecting 
the Ocean Environment (PDD/NSC-36); Maritime Security Policy (NSPD-41/HSPC-
13); and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) (US State Department, 
2015).  
Canada’s first priority in the Arctic is to resolve national boundaries 
(Government of Canada, 2015).   Canada’s Arctic policy includes plans and provisions 
for regional governments. Further, Canada desires dynamic economic and social 
development, and environmental protection.  Canada wants to extend the current 
Economic Exclusion Zone beyond the 200 nautical miles.  
Russian Arctic policy is mainly determined by two documents: “The 
fundamentals of state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 
2020 and beyond” (Osnovy 2008); and the “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation for the period up to 2020” (Padrtova 2012). Russia’s national interests are 
based on two elements – natural resources and maritime transport (Osnovy 2008). 
Russia, too, desires to extend its Economic Exclusion Zone beyond the 200 nautical 
miles.  
The Nordic countries have many policies relating to the Arctic.  Finland’s Arctic 
policy is to enhance its involvement in the region.  The objectives of Finland's Arctic 
policy are to strengthen multilateral Arctic cooperation; to take part in the shaping of the 
EU's Arctic policy; and to raise Finland's profile as an expert in Arctic issues (Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2015). Norway’s policy on the governance of the Arctic 
gives priority to the following five areas: international cooperation, the development of a 
knowledge-based business sector, knowledge development, infrastructure, and 
emergency preparedness and environmental protection (Regjeringen.no, 2015). 
However, there is no legislation for Norway’s policy for law.   Denmark’s policy is to 
work for a peaceful, secure, and safe Arctic with self-sustaining growth and 
development with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate, environment, and nature in 
close cooperation with international partners (Kingdom of Denmark, 2011).  However, 
there is no actual legislation for this policy. The Arctic policy of Sweden is seen through 
three priorities of the climate and the environment, economic development and the 
human dimension (ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).  Iceland’s policy encompasses 12 
principles including promoting the Arctic Council, securing Iceland’s position as a 
council leader, promoting understanding of the region, resolving differences under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, increasing cooperation, supporting 
the right of indigenous people, promoting cooperation, prevent human induced climate 
change, safeguard security, develop trade relations, advancing knowledge, and 
increasing domestic cooperation within Iceland on the Arctic (Iceland, 2011).  The 
parliament passed this policy in 2011. 
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2.2 Wicked Problems and Working in the Arctic 
 
A wicked problem is one where the planning for adverse events is difficult or 
impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements 
that are often difficult to recognize.   Wicked problems are generally seen as complex, 
open-ended, and intractable (Head, 2008). They can be defined in several ways, and 
have multiple characteristics (Camillus, 2008). Past decisions, historical trends, and 
current industry knowledge may not be useful in addressing wicked problems compared 
to other events (Rittel and Webber 1973; Koelsch 2014).  Wicked problems are 
influenced by many economic, social, and political factors, and biophysical 
complexities: and the cause and effect of these factors and complexities are difficult to 
determine (Batie, 2008; Koelsch, 2014).  For example, the wicked problem of the 
disaster prevention and response in the Arctic may be due to a lack of communication 
among stakeholders, a lack of research in the Arctic environment, a lack of organization 
or infrastructure, all the above, or none of the above.  
The ‘wicked problem’ framework has not been widely adopted in management.  
This maybe due to the fact that wicked problems are viewed as unsolvable because of 
their complexity (Rittel and Webber 1973).  However, wicked problems can become 
better mitigated with proper identification of issues, requirements, and constraints 
(Koelsch 2014).   
Further, global industries such as the maritime industry contributes to complexity 
of issues and decisions when addressing operations, which may lead to disaster or other 
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adverse events in a harsh environment such as the Arctic.  The complexity of issues may 
increase chances of human error. The changing environment both of the Arctic and the 
economic pressures on the maritime industry constrain solutions/betterment (Kampf and 
Haley 2011).  
However, management of stakeholders and their conflicting and competing 
values has been recognized in the management and organizational theory literature as 
critical to survival and success of firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and is a critical 
factor in addressing wicked problem mitigation (Conklin 2006).  Stakeholder 
participation has been considered important for firms operating in the marine 
environment (Mileski et al 2010).  Further, stakeholders view potential solutions, 
interdependencies, and influences on the wicked problem differently (Koelsch 2014).   
Therefore, as the Arctic environment is becoming more accessible to the 
international community with its many stakeholders with different values and priorities 
(Camillus, 2008) - employees and trade unions; shareholders, investors, and creditors; 
suppliers and joint venture partners; the governments of the different nations where they 
operate; nongovernmental organizations, the eight Arctic states, and customers, among 
others, the social complexity increases.  Further changes in technology, regulations, and 
economic demand influence potential solutions/betterments.  Governance for wicked 
problems must depend on the collective judgment of stakeholders in a process that is 
experiential, interactive, and deliberative (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009).  
So, one of the steps toward mitigating a wicked problem is to involve 
stakeholders, document opinions, and communicate (Robert 2000). The focus should be 
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to create a shared understanding of the problem and foster a joint commitment to work 
towards resolving it. Not everyone will agree on what the problem is, but stakeholders 
should be able to understand one another’s position well enough to discuss different 
interpretations of the problem and work towards mitigation (Camillus, 2008).  Wicked 
problems require complex answers, but they can be improved in small increments.  The 
wicked problem of prevention and response to a maritime disaster in the Arctic can be 
met through collaboration and cooperation of its stakeholders. The next section discusses 
how to facilitate the collaboration and cooperation of stakeholders attempting to better a 
wicked problem situation for disaster prevention and response.  
2.3 Art and Strategy of Cooperation 
Individually, we are one drop. Together, we are an ocean. 
-Ryunosuke Satoro 
Axelrod (1980), in his Art of Cooperation, suggests that a cooperative strategy is 
necessary in facing a dilemma when groups face ongoing interaction and each party 
receives mutual gains from cooperation. This game theory is elucidated through the 
prisoner’s dilemma example using the United States and Canada (See Figure 5).  If 
Canada chooses to cooperate and the United States chooses to not cooperate/defect, then 
we see Canada receiving the sucker’s reward with zero while the U.S. gains all benefit.  
For example, these two nations can be cooperating when planning for disaster response 
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in their use of assets for clean up efforts.  If both the United States and Canada choose 
not to cooperate/defect, then both are punished with minimum benefit.  Only if both 
cooperate, will they each gain mutual benefit.  A disaster or adverse event could also be 
considered a dilemma for the maritime stakeholders working in the Arctic. The ongoing 
interaction between nations is working in the same Arctic waters. Moreover, Axelrod 
notes the possibility that one party will exploit another in the dilemma and that no one 
will cooperate. Disaster can happen to any party due to human error. Having a plan of 
response to a disaster in place motivates cooperation, versus not having a response to 
disaster.  For example, the Baltic Master plan addresses maritime security and safety. 
When parties only pursue their self-interests, it creates a less desirable outcome for all is 
described in the cooperation theory as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1980). 
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PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Figure 5. Game Theory: Prisoner's Dilemma Model 
(P= Punishment; T= Temptation to Defect; R= Reward; S=Sucker) 
Reference: Axelrod, Robert 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation  
The assumption of Axelrod’s theory contends that parties pursue their own self-
interest without the aid of a central authority to force them to corporate with each other.  
Currently, there is no central authority for enforcement of policy in the Arctic.  The 
Arctic Council, the United Nations, and the International Maritime Organization all have 
some authority; however, there is no one authority over all maritime industry parties for 
all current and potential activities in the Arctic.  
Further, an Arctic maritime disaster or adverse event may challenge or create a 
prisoner’s dilemma for the security of various parties including nations.  The situation 
where parties pursuing their own self-interest creates a less desirable outcome for all is 
described in the cooperation theory as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1980).  The 
parties may seek their own security through their own means, which challenge the 
Canada	  
United	  States
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security of others.  This self-pursuit of assets for disaster response may not appropriately 
solve the prisoner’s dilemma. For example, in a maritime disaster, one party may not 
have the full knowledge and resources to resolve the situation such as what occurred in 
the Gulf of Mexico Macondo oil spill.  In that spill, there were several failed efforts to 
contain the flow of the well that led to it being one of the largest accidental marine oil 
spills in history. Potentially, not sharing knowledge and resources stakeholders due to 
security concerns may have resulted in more damage (such as greater pollution) to all 
parties from the disaster.    
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is best illustrated as a game.  In the game, there are two 
players with the choice to either cooperate or not cooperate the other.  Neither knows 
what the other player will do.  Not cooperating appears to have a payoff greater than 
cooperation, i.e., using and controlling one’s own assets to respond to disaster. 
However, there are disaster response benefits from cooperation because of quicker, more 
effective response when assets and expertise are combined. If both chose not to 
cooperate, then both will suffer the maximum consequence.  If both cooperate, then both 
benefit from the best outcome.  So, ultimately, non-cooperation for self-interest tends to 
lead to the worse outcome for both. 
Arctic stakeholders face a Prisoner’s Dilemma in a disaster situation which, in 
turn, contributes to the complexity of the wicked problem. It is important to understand 
that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not a situation of opposing interests or a zero sum game 
where one side does well, and the other must do badly.  Both sides can do well. For 
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competing entities operating in the Arctic, many can benefit from collaborative efforts in 
a disaster. A plan still benefits the whole rather than all separate.  
2.4 Free Riders 
Free riders are non-cooperative parties who benefit from the efforts of 
cooperation, such as in the case of a disaster prevention, mitigation, or response (Sandler 
2008). Cooperation may be beneficial even if all parties do not participate equally to the 
cooperation agreement.  Under the theory of Strategic Alliance, two or more 
independent parties can enter into an agreement to work together toward common 
objectives (Wakeam, 2013). Strategic alliances embrace a diversity of collaborative 
forms (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).  One of the most noted strategic alliances is the 
National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cooperating among countries for 
security (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). 
The criteria of a strategic alliance are critical to the success of a core goal or 
objective because it helps block threats, mitigates risk, and creates strategic choices 
(Wakeam, 2013).  For example, an open Arctic Ocean creates opportunities for countries 
like China to join as a member of the Arctic Council and create strategic alliances to 
widen their connectivity to maritime business (Hong, 2012).  Mutual reward in a 
strategic alliance comes though the norm of reciprocity. The emergence of these 
cooperative agreements can be explained as a consequence of parties pursing their own 
interests (Axelrod, 1980). However, everyone can best benefit if there is mutual trust and 
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transparency (Axelrod, 1980). But, countries, such as Russia, that are very powerful and 
self-reliant may not be as willing to cooperate with other Arctic states on plans for 
prevention and response to maritime disasters.  
How, then, are free riders addressed in cooperation efforts? Those who do not 
contribute but benefit from the efforts of others can cause the collapse of cooperation. 
However, groups that sanction such free riders stabilize cooperative behavior (Henrich, 
2006). Conditional cooperation from selfish and rational actors is sometimes feasible in 
repeated encounters, which is supported by the norm of reciprocity (Abell and Reyniers 
2000).  Even though mutual cooperation is possible, it is not always achieved. 
Cooperation among involved Arctic stakeholders may be the most effective mechanism 
for an appropriate plan for disaster prevention and response, and cooperation will play a 
vital role in increasing collective benefit (Sandler 2008).  If there is a collective benefit, 
then there will be an increase in maritime effectiveness; thus, increasing the speed of 
maritime disaster response (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).  Further, cooperation 
strategies free up resources (Pfeffer 1976) which can be used to address aspects of 
bettering the wicked problem such as creating a plan for disaster prevention and 
response.  
2.5 Planning for Prevention and Response for Maritime Related Disasters 
  As stated above, a wicked problem is one where the planning for adverse events
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is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing 
requirements that are often difficult to recognize.   Wicked problems cannot be solved 
but can be mitigated; however, they must be made better incrementally or in stages after 
which the wicked problem changes.  Applying cooperation in Arctic disaster prevention 
and response planning can be a successful way to address this wicked problem. 
To address how to apply cooperation strategies to Arctic maritime disaster 
prevention and disaster response, we must understand the wicked problem of Arctic 
disaster and its potential impact.  Disaster as defined by Fritz (1961) as an “event 
concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or relatively self-sufficient 
subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs losses and physical 
appurtenances such that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or 
some of the essential functions of the society are prevented.” Response is defined by 
addressing necessary social functions disrupted by the immediate consequences of the 
disaster (Quarantelli 1987).  We define “social structure” broadly to include economic, 
environmental, social, and political territories in the Arctic.   
Disasters produce a range of impacts that can be characterized as direct, 
secondary, and indirect effects (Lindell, Tierney, & Perry, 2001).   Direct effects include 
the deaths, injuries, and physical damage and destruction that are caused by the impact 
of the disaster agent itself.  Secondary effects complicate response and recovery efforts 
because these occurrences may cause more impact than the disaster itself (Lindell, 
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Tierney, & Perry, 2001). If disaster takes places, such as flooding for example, then 
environmental pollution would be considered the secondary effect.  The cleanup efforts 
for the pollution may be worse than the flooding itself.  The indirect effect of a disaster 
includes “the ripple effects” resulting from disruptions in the flow of services, 
unemployment, business interruption, and declines in levels of economic activity and 
productivity (Lindell, Tierney, & Perry, 2001). 
Effective disaster response requires proper planning (Mileski and Honeycutt 
2013).  The primary goal of emergency preparedness is for entities, businesses, and 
government agencies to develop appropriate strategies for responding when disaster 
occurs.  Society tends to respond to the last disaster that has taken place on which to 
base their preparation (Popik, 2010) so comprehensive planning is needed where all 
phases of all types of disaster events are considered in the plan (Mileski and Honeycutt 
2013).  Emergency planning involves two basic components: physical preparedness and 
social preparedness (Gillespie et al. 1993).  Physical preparedness entails ensuring that 
infrastructure can withstand disaster and uphold safety.  Social preparedness means 
training, planning, and educating community of stakeholders (Lindell, Tierney, & Perry, 
2001).  Further, the plan should address pre-impact planning and post-impact response.  
Decision-making during both processes should have a framework that does not exclude 
the possible unforeseen event (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).  The wicked problem 
serves as that framework because of the issues of the unforeseen event that emerge are 
constantly changing and evolving into new challenges.    
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In order to organize effective disaster response decision-making through the 
comprehensive plan, the three dimensions of Mileski and Honeycutt’s (2013) response 
decision-making framework is reviewed.   The first dimension of the problem is the 
nature of the disaster.  Disaster can be caused by natural events, human error, or a 
terrorist act.  The second dimension is the nature of responder.  To effectively respond to 
disaster, responders must accurately respond to a disaster, effectively communicate, and 
recommend solutions.   The third dimension is the nature of the recipient, whether it is a 
business, local citizen, or government.  Ultimately, flexibility is needed in all disaster 
planning, especially in the ability to respond.   However, flexibility levels can vary 
depending on the type of disaster.   
In implementing a plan of a response to a maritime disaster using maritime 
assets, the speed and timing is affected by three factors (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).   
The first is the ability of the response to disaster, which is dependent on the control of 
maritime assets and the level of design specificity of the maritime assets.  The second 
factor is the experience for the response so whoever controls the maritime assets must 
have the experience to deploy those assets in the specific disaster.  The third factor is the 
staging of the response which is the strategic positioning of maritime assets or the where, 
when, and with what.    
Since the response to a wicked problem such as an Arctic disaster is dependent 
upon the three factors of ability, experience and staging, flexibility in the plan and the 
implementation is a key factor (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).  Mileski and Honeycutt 
(2013) suggest cooperation strategy where there is asymmetry of information such as in 
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a post-disaster and a prisoner’s dilemma exists as in the competition for maritime assets.  
Asymmetry of information may occur due to the nature of the wicked problem of an 
Arctic disaster. The mitigation is to encourage and implement a plan of response of 
cooperative effort to respond to Arctic disasters.   
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III. STRATEGIES AND THE MODEL FOR COOPERATION 
 
In a complex system of environmental, social, political, and legal concerns and a 
marine environment including Arctic stakeholders, the framework of a wicked problem 
fits well. The first step towards mitigating a wicked problem is to understand its 
complexity. In doing so, we must recognize that wicked problems will constantly 
change.  One change occurs with the emergence of new entrants. New entrants are, for 
example, non-member Arctic Council state entities that enter Arctic waters to explore 
resources and activities.  The second change is the change a disaster has on entities 
involved.  For example, disaster will have a very different impact on the local economy 
of the indigenous people that it will have on private corporate entities. 
Wicked problems are mitigated if broken down into smaller, more manageable 
parts addressing one part of the problem at a time. Further, the mitigation of wicked 
problems faced in the Arctic requires a more hands on, interactive approach.   An 
interactive, hands on approach will require those involved to make adjustments as the 
problems occur and change.   
Social and political problems embedded in a wicked problem are never solved, 
but must be mitigated over and over again as they change (Rittel and Webber, 1973).  
Similarly, disaster planning issues are also faced over and over again in many different 
ways, as is the response to disasters. Effective planning prepares for any disaster (not 
just the last one) and is flexible if unpredictability is encountered. Further, effective 
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planning can limit (made better) the impact of a disaster in both public and private 
sectors (Ritchie, 2004).   
As stated above, responsible planning and response to disaster are best addressed 
as a cooperative event (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).  Further, a mishap causing a 
disaster in the Arctic will likely take place.  This means that it is highly possible Arctic 
stakeholders will have to interact whether or not there is an established plan for a 
cooperative response.    
Cooperation strategy and implementation can be addressed through dynamic 
multilateral cooperation (Sandler, 2008).  Although this research contends that 
cooperation is the best way to mitigate “wicked problems” in the Arctic disasters,  there 
are some advantages to competitive rather than cooperative strategies to solve wicked 
problems. Competitive strategies challenge the institutionalization of power (Roberts, 
2000), and it may be important to keep power circulating among the stakeholders 
particularly in the Arctic.  However, cooperation can manifest itself through alliances, 
partnerships, and joint ventures and incorporates both the transfer of power and the use 
of collaborative strategies.  The wicked problem of addressing an Arctic disaster can be 
used as grounds for dynamic cooperation (Sandler, 2008). 
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Figure 6. Model of Cooperation 
 
This research results in the following cooperation model. A model of cooperation 
is presented to encourage stakeholder cooperation for a plan of prevention and response 
to an Arctic maritime disaster (See Figure 6).  First, stakeholders are identified.  The 
Arctic Council can be used as the starting population of stakeholders.  Members of the 
Arctic Council can be approached to identify the Council’s stakeholders.  Once 
stakeholders are identified, a request to cooperate through a common disaster plan of 
response should be made.  Cooperation should be on a voluntary basis.  For 
public/government and private stakeholders who choose not to cooperate when disaster 
takes place, members who do participate should still support the free rider in the time of 
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need and disaster.  However, an incentive system may be put in place to encourage 
cooperation.    
Next, a plan must be prepared. Mileski and Honeycutt (2013) state that an 
accounting for maritime assets available to respond to a disaster.  Further, the use and 
deployment of the assets must be assessed preferably by a designated manager or 
management team.  This team would optimize the utilization of these assets during a 
disaster response and prevent competition among stakeholders for these assets.  The 
manager identified in the plan must have the skills at staging and coordinating maritime 
assets.  Further, the manager must be given authority of the asset used by the various 
stakeholders in the plan across all countries.   
Once stakeholders are identified and the plan is in place, interactive decision-
making among all stakeholders should be anticipated during any response to an Arctic 
disaster.  This must be anticipated in wicked problems as the circumstances of the 
problem are constantly changing and reacting to any action taken with regard to the 
problem.  Appointed stakeholder leaders along with the manager share information with 
stakeholders and respond to stakeholder suggestions during and after the disaster 
response.   
Using the Arctic Council can contribute to this collaborative system and plan to 
limit the impact of disaster in the Arctic.  However, once cooperation is established, a 
mechanism for enforcement should be created that requires some level of 
payment/reimbursement for the efforts of those who cooperated and provided response. 
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For example, a fine or added tariff for stakeholders may be assessed by the Arctic 
Council directly for not following proper maritime procedures under the plan.  
 34 
 
IV.IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARCTIC MARITIME DISASTER PLAN 
 
The previous section describes the plan, while this section describes how the plan 
will be implemented. Contributing to the wicked problem of an Arctic response is the 
relative operational inefficiencies in parts of the maritime industry (Panayides et al 
2011).  Again this research emphasizes coordination of an Arctic disaster response will 
be more effective if a plan is in place prior to any events (Thomas and Fritz 2006). The 
plan should contain marine asset provisions for public and private stakeholders to be 
effective and be flexible in the provisions and the implementation (Mileski and 
Honeycutt 2013).  All of these plan provisions, regardless of when and what type of 
disaster takes place, should be as a result of the interactive decision making process of 
cooperation among the stakeholders.  
First, as indicated above the plan should designate a manager. The designation 
should be given to a manager based the combination of his/her experience in the 
industry, leadership ability, coordination skills and his/her experience handling any 
previous disasters rather than on mere legal or governmental authority (Mileski and 
Honeycutt 2013). Further, there may be several managers needed for various tasks 
related to the wicked problem.  For example, a manager in a private company with a 
technical background may be able to coordinate maritime assets needed to combat the 
Arctic environment during the disaster but may not be the best communicator to 
indigenous stakeholders.   
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Second, the plan should clearly state stakeholder responsibilities and required 
actions during and after a disaster as well as agreed upon actions to be taken by the 
designated response manager or managers. During a disaster, implementation of the plan 
requires flexibility.  Asymmetry of information (all parties may not receive all 
information at the same time) may occur due to the nature of the wicked problem of an 
Arctic disaster so communication from the designated manager to and from the 
stakeholders is first priority. Further, the designated manager should communicate with 
the Arctic Council.   
Third, the plan must contain an inventory of maritime assets, capabilities and 
competencies owned by both public and private Arctic stakeholders.  If needed response 
assets, capabilities and competencies are not owned by the stakeholders, the plan should 
contain contingency provisions to acquire the needed inventory for the disaster. This 
inventory helps address the prisoner’s dilemma that occurs due to competition among 
various stakeholders for assets, capabilities, and competencies during a response. 
Fourth, as noted above in previous section if an incentive system is in place, the 
manager should have authority from all stakeholders participating to enforce the system.  
For example, maritime assets requisitioned may be entitled to compensation paid by all 
appropriate stakeholders whom the owner receives compensation.  Asset activation and 
utilization rates should be negotiated as part of the plan (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).  
The incentive system can be monitored by the Arctic Council to make sure 
compensation is properly distributed to stakeholders, in order to lower and discourage 
system corruption assuming the Artic Council would agree to the manager.  
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The disaster response should have uniform safety procedures across multiple 
levels to prevent future disasters while proactively promoting proper planning for 
disaster. Proper safety measures must address the placement of assets, type of 
equipment, and properly trained personnel. Uniform safety procedures are important for 
consistency of response among stakeholders. Safety authority should be given to the 
designated manager. The manager must train response personnel including the 
indigenous people, to follow disaster response safety protocol.    
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V. CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The interconnectivity of services and assets needed in disaster response and 
prevention confirms the need to address a wicked problem. The plan should allow for 
training potentially managers. Gathering information on maritime assets, capabilities and 
competencies across all Arctic stakeholders will be a challenge.  However, each member 
of the Arctic Council can contribute to overcoming this challenge.  For example, the 
United States, as current chair of the Council, can show how to gather such information 
with the help of the American Bureau of Shipping, the United States Coast Guard, the 
United States Transportation Security Administration and Alaska.  As reported by 
Mileski and Honeycutt (2013), “The American Bureau of Shipping records the physical 
characteristics and primary capabilities of all U.S. flagged ships.  The United States 
Coast Guard, through the National Vessel Documentation Center, documents all vessels 
five tons or greater that are employed in fishing activity or coastwise trade on the 
navigable waters of the US or in the Exclusive Economic Zone (USCG 2012).  The U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration approves and monitors the personnel that are 
employed on and have unrestricted access to vessels (MTSA 2002).  Haas (2010) 
identifies 12.7 million recreational boats registered by state offices.”  The Macondo 
incident used recreational boats to assist in cleanup efforts.  
Further, the IMO can assist on overcoming the challenge as well.  The IMO 
governs flagging.  For example, the ships that meet requirements for disaster response 
should be allowed to show compliance by an Arctic Council flag or another symbol of 
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approval.  The flag gives legitimacy to organization as a good and prepared world citizen 
protecting and mitigating against Arctic disaster damage. This will not only assist in 
creating a new norm of disaster awareness and preparedness among a diverse team of 
stakeholders, but also help provide incentive to become distinguished for meeting 
requirements for response and maritime assets. 
Additionally, the Arctic indigenous people are asking maritime industry firms to 
pay large amounts for entering their environment in exchange for growing their local 
economies (Nuttall 2000).  This adds to the complexity and interconnectivity of the 
Arctic disaster response wicked problem as stakeholders are highly interconnected.   
Some local governments are requesting investment in personnel training and 
infrastructure improvement in exchange for the procurement of resources. Many of the 
indigenous people benefit because they learn skills and obtain jobs (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2004).  However, if Arctic stakeholders are able to properly communicate 
through a plan to respond with coordinated mitigation local economies will grow.   
 
5.1 Implications for Managerial Practice 
 
International support of contingency planning can be implemented for an Arctic 
maritime disaster. As stated above, the Baltic Master plan is an example of cooperation 
for maritime safety (Jeppson 2011).  Although maritime disasters are rare, more can be 
done to plan for response and mitigation. Clearly, the stakeholders need to create a plan 
and evaluate implementation options.  However, more research is needed to pinpoint 
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what motivates stakeholders to join in a cooperative plan without global regulation 
interventions.  Given the increasing importance of the Arctic environment for the 
maritime and related industries, the results of this study can be useful to policymakers 
and industry decision makers.   
Future research should collect data on Arctic specific maritime assets, 
capabilities, and competencies for the wicked problem of disaster planning and response.  
This information will assist with plan development and disaster response. Flexibility is 
required as the type of response is disaster dependent. Disaster preparedness and 
flexibility can often prevent it or mitigate its damage, so data on maritime assets may 
help to plan for the prevention and response to the rare event of disaster. 
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